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 1 
Introduction  
This working paper is based on a speech given by the author at ZERP-
Universität Bremen, in response to an invitation by Prof. Christoph Schmid, on 
7th December 2007.  
The topic of the Eurohypothec is older than 60 years now, but it is only re-
cently that it has again assumed prominence on the European Commission’s 
agenda.  
It all began with the release of the Green Paper on the Mortgage Market 
2005, which dedicated a whole point of discussion to the idea of the Eurohy-
pothec, quoting a piece of research that contains the model of Eurohypothec 
that was created by a group of researchers after several years of studying the 
matter: the Basic Guidelines for a Eurohypothec 2005.1 In December 2007, the 
EC White Paper, which deals with the steps required to advance the integration 
of EU mortgage markets, was released.  
This working paper seeks to depict the Eurohypothec and the Eurotrust 
from the perspective of the EU Commission Green Paper 2005 and the EU 
Commission White Paper 2007, while providing a real case of a new mortgage 
law (the Spanish one) that does not achieve the same degree of usefulness that 
the Eurohypothec provides.  
I. The Eurohypothec  
1. The Eurohypothec as an ideal model of a Paneuropean real 
charge  
When Eurohypothec researchers tried to achieve a “common mortgage” model 
for Europe, they searched for an ideal model, in the sense that it was not neces-
sarily a real model, but one which would be as much useful as possible for 
purposes of the main goal: creating a Paneuropean mortgage tool that facili-
tates the creation of a true Paneuropean mortgage market.  
Therefore, the currently presented model (the model in the Basic Guidelines 
2005)2 should, in any case, prove to be more beneficial than that offered by 
the current instruments of transnational mortgage funding. The typical transna-
tional situation that the Eurohypothec seeks to address refers to the case where 
                                                 
1 Drewicz-Tulodziecka, Agnieszka (Ed.), Basic Guidelines for a Eurohypothec, Mort-
gage Credit Foundation, Warsaw, 2005. 
2  See below. 
 2 
the lender is in a different EU country other than the piece of land which is to 
be used as security for the loan/loans to be granted to a borrower, irrespective 
of where he is.  
This “more beneficial” idea should relate both to the lender and borrower:  
a) Lender: the Eurohypothec should be able to facilitate the development of 
a legal framework for optimal Paneuropean mortgage lending and mort-
gage funding (active and passive operations of the mortgage market).  
b) Borrower: Greater freedom in choosing (and changing) the lender, due to 
increased competition. According to a recent report by Mercer Oliver & 
Wyman for the European Mortgage Federation (2007),3 a link exists be-
tween the decrease in costs of a mortgage and an increase in the concur-
rence among credit institutions in several European countries in recent 
years, as illustrated in Germany, Ireland, Greece, France and Belgium. 
The White Paper 2007 supports the same idea (p. 13).  
One important question to be addressed before drafting the model was the im-
pact and the efficacy of the Eurohypothec, that is, what was to be changed in 
the European mortgage market and when. The resulting decision would not 
only alter the way in which the model was conceived, but also its scope.  
According to recently obtained results, the Eurohypothec is generating two 
effects:  
1. At an initial stage, it is serving as:  
–   an inspiration for jurisdictions that do not have a well-functioning 
mortgage system or that do not have any at all (ie. as is still evidenced 
in some East-European countries);  
–    an inspiration to those jurisdictions that already have one, but are re-
forming it, in order to adapt to modern times and needs.  
In essence, it is intended to indicate the direction to be taken by mortgage law 
reforms or implementations in each national jurisdiction. That is, what chal-
lenges are to be achieved in the modern context of law of mortgages in Europe. 
As a whole, what the benefits of a cross-border mortgage are; what answers it 
should provide and to whom.  
In fact, following the introduction of the Basic Guidelines 2005, two “tradi-
tional” mortgage systems were reformed: the French, through the Ordinance 
                                                 
3  European Mortgage Federation and Mercer Oliver & Wyman, European mortgage 
markets – 2006 adjusted price analysis, www.hypo.org. 
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23-3-20064 and the Spanish one, through the Act 41/20075. These share some-
thing in common: they both consider the flexibility of their mortgage laws, 
which to a large extent, coincides with the goal of usefulness through the flexi-
bility that governs the Eurohypothec pursuant to the Basic Guidelines. How-
ever, neither of them – as we will see in the Spanish case – has achieved the 
Eurohypothec’s level of flexibility/usefulness.  
2. At a second stage, the Eurohypothec should serve as a common instru-
ment for the European mortgage market, thus helping to fulfil the goals of the 
EU: freedom of people and freedom of capital throughout EU member states. 
It should be a useful and optimal common transnational mortgage instrument. 
This second stage does not require any changes to the legal framework for 
mortgages in any national jurisdiction, as far as the Eurohypothec does not try 
to substitute any of the already existing national mortgages.  
3. At a third stage, national jurisdictions should realise the importance of 
adapting their own legislation to maximise the benefits provided by the Euro-
hypothec- once it is clear to them, for example, that their enforcement proce-
dures are not timely or that their insolvency law does not sufficiently secure 
the mortgagee. These – and some other – factors would make the Eurohy-
pothec granted in that particular country to be more expensive (more difficult 
to be granted, higher interest rate for the borrower) than the same instrument in 
another jurisdiction with better legal infrastructures, which would in turn cause 
prejudice amongst its citizens, thus leading to further legislative reforms.  
2. Why talk about the Eurohypothec?  
As mentioned previously, the idea is far from new. Prof. Claudio Segré insti-
gated the concept of creating a common mortgage instrument in the 60s – as 
commissioned by the EC. His proposed model was the Swiss Schuldbrief. Pro-
gressive work on the Eurohypothec, was undertaken in the following years by 
certain institutions such as the International Union of Latin Notaries and by re-
nowned authors (more intensively by Prof. Wehrens6 and Dr. Stöcker7).  
                                                 
4  Ordonnance n°2006-346, 23-3-2006 (JORF 24-3-2006). 
5  See below. 
6 Wehrens, Hans G., Überlegungen zu einer Eurohypothek, “Wertpapier Mitteilungen – 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht”, num. 14, April 1992, pp. 557 a 596. 
7 Stöcker, Otmar, Die Eurohypothek, Berlin, 1992, Ed. Duncker & Humblot. The most 
recent article on this topic is Stöcker, Otmar, Real estate liens as security for cross-
order property finance. The Eurohypothec, a security instrument with real prospects, 
“Revista Crítica de Derecho Inmobiliario” (Spain), num. 703, 2007, pp. 2255-2277. 
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In 2004, a special research group was set up to study the Eurohypothec 
(www.eurohypothec.com). This group not only organized several research 
events, but also took part in seminars that resulted in the redaction of the Basic 
Guidelines 2005, which also involved the participation of researchers from dif-
ferent groups and backgrounds. A few months later, the Internal Market Af-
fairs Department of the European Commission issued the Green Paper on 
Mortgage Credit 2005, which at some point addressed a question considered 
by governments, mortgage market stakeholders and researchers on the useful-
ness and importance of the Eurohypothec. The response was very positive as 
can be seen in Table 1. 
 
 IN FAVOR OF THE BASIC GUIDELINES 
EUROHYPOTHEC 
MODEL 
IN FAVOR OF THE 
IDEA OF THE EURO-
HYPOTHEC, BUT WITH 
ANOTHER MODEL 
HAVE DOUBTS/NEED 
MORE INFORMATION 
AGAINST THE EURO-
HYPOTHEC IDEA 
GOVERNMENTS CYPRUS 
POLAND 
CZECH REPUBLIK 
IRELAND 
FINNLAND 
HUNGARY 
SPAIN 
 
SWEDEN ESTONIA 
GERMANY 
AUSTRIA 
CORPORATIONS Citigroup Inc., 
International Search-
Flow, UK 
Crédit Agricole (CA), FR
Halifax Bank of Scotland 
plc (HBOS), UK 
Lloyds TSB Group, UK 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group (RBS), UK 
BBVA, ES Baclays PLC, UK 
GMAC – RFC 
Limited, UK 
HVB Group, DE 
ABN AMRO, NL 
Banca Intesa, IT 
EU INSTITUTIONS European Central Bank 
— Eurosystem, EU 
European Economic and 
Social Committee 
   
 
Table 1.  Response to the Eurohypothec question as illustrated by the Green Paper on Mort-
gage Credit in the EU.  
Although a more extensive study of these responses can be found elsewhere,8 
the conclusion to be derived is that most respondents were either in favour of 
regulating the Eurohypothec, according to the model foreseen in the Basic 
Guidelines 2005, or proposed another model.  
                                                 
8 See Nasarre Aznar, Sergio, Reacciones en torno a la Eurohipoteca al Libro Verde de 
la Unión Europea sobre el crédito hipotecario, at Muñiz, Nasarre y Sánchez Jordán, 
“Un modello para una Eurohipoteca. Desde el Informe Segré hasta hoy”, Cuadernos 
de Derecho Registral, Madrid, 2008, Colegio de Registradores de la Propiedad y Mer-
cantiles de España. 
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Despite the positive response to the idea, the EU Commission has continued 
to rely on an institution – the European Mortgage Federation, a representative 
of lending institutions in Europe – which for many years has not supported the 
idea of achieving such a common instrument for trans-national mortgage op-
erations. The created sub-group unit within the EMF was closed during 2006, 
without any enthusiastic support for the creation of the Eurohypothec.  
However, other sub-groups created by the EC Commission for the purpose 
of investigating other areas of the Green Paper have worked more actively and 
with more enthusiasm towards European convergence in their fields of knowl-
edge. In fact, they have seized the opportunity to raise certain issues surround-
ing the mortgage market that substantially coincide with the features of the Eu-
rohypothec, as foreseen in the Basic Guidelines. The two main reports relating 
to these issues included those of :  
A) The Mortgage industry consumer dialogue group (MICDG). Composed of 
consumers and lenders, few agreements were concluded because of variations 
in opinions, which related to important matters. Conclusions in three very rele-
vant areas were however achieved namely:  
Precontractual information 
–    When should it be given? The question was related to whether it 
should be given before or after the customer had provided his details 
(the latter being the bank’s option) and in which timeframe.  
–    Improvements to the ESIS (European Standardized Information 
Sheet)9, that is, whether the ESIS should include more accurate infor-
mation in relation to the mortgage that the consumer was going to take 
out.  
–    Efficacy of the Code of Conduct on mortgages. While today, this is 
only a matter of voluntary application by some credit institutions in 
Europe, consumers in the sub-group wanted to make it compulsory, 
while banks considered that this would lead to more rigidities in mort-
gage operations. 
                                                 
9  The obligation to give consumers (mortgagors) this standardised Sheet with all infor-
mation regarding to the mortgage loan, which makes easier to them to compare the 
conditions under which mortgage loans are offered before the conclusion of the con-
tract, was introduced by the Voluntary Code of Conduct on Pre-Contractual informa-
tion for Home Loans, which was negotiated between European conumer associations 
and the European mortgage lending industry. More infromation at Annex 3 White Pa-
per 2007, pp. 12 and 13. 
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Assessment  
–    INFORMATION (description of the product) should be differentiated 
from ASSESSMENT (recommendation of the product) and from 
RISK WARNING (lender should rate the indebtedness capacity of the 
borrower).  
Pre-payment rights  
–    Significant differences exist between this being a contractual right 
(lenders) or a statutory right (consumers). In addressing country opin-
ions, countries like Spain have granted to consumers a statutory right 
to enable prepayment of any amounts of the loan at any time – al-
though in Spain, credit institutions are able to charge extra fees to 
compensate for the losses they may incur (prior to the Mortgage Re-
form 2007 -which attempts to address the problem- such losses were 
unduly calculated). The situation in other countries is the opposite: 
credit institutions and consumers may agree to foresee (more expen-
sive mortgages, that is, worse conditions and higher interest rates for 
consumers in exchange of the freedom) or not to foresee (less expen-
sive mortgages) prepayment rights for consumers.  
This report was interesting for the Eurohypothec conception process because it 
made clear the point that the “contractual” aspect of a mortgage loan relation-
ship is one thing, whilst its “real” (right in rem) part is another. The Eurohy-
pothec has no connection to the contractual aspect and therefore has no links 
with the contractual aspects of consumer protections at all. It is only related to 
the “right in rem” aspect in the sense that it only deals with a model of security 
right on real estate, that is, the mode in which the lending contract, which will 
include all necessary consumer-protection issues, will be secured. Some other 
issues, like prepayment rights, may have a direct impact on the passive opera-
tions of the mortgage market, that is, the “stability” and “foreseeability” of 
mortgage securities (especially, covered bonds).10  
                                                 
10  In a broad sense, mortgage securities –mainly mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and 
covered bonds- are those securities, backed either by a pool of mortgages held by a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) –the MBS- or by the originator of the backing mort-
gages itself –the case of covered bonds. Mortgage securities are the passive side (in 
some cases known as the secondary mortgage market) of the mortgage market (the ac-
tive side is, essentially, the granting of mortgage loans), which means that mortgage 
securities refinance (fund) credit institutions’ business of mortgage lending. The better 
the mortgage funding is, the better conditions and the better interest rates mortgage 
loans have. See below for more details and see also Nasarre Aznar, Sergio, Securitisa-
tion & mortgage bonds. Legal aspects and harmonization in Europe, Saffron Walden 
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B) The Mortgage funding expert group (MFEG), composed only of lenders, of 
course, concluded more agreements. The issue relating to mortgage securities 
was precisely the central discussion point addressed by the MFEG. These dis-
cussions have produced some interesting points:  
–    The concept of “mortgage market” is a complete one, as it includes 
both active operations (lending) and passive operations (mortgage 
funding). It now seems definitely clear that mortgage lending opera-
tions cannot be understood without a complete and well-functioning 
(from a financial and from a legal point of view) mortgage funding 
system.11  
–    Need to integrate passive operations on the mortgage markets. To-
day 60% of all European mortgage loans (long term investments) are 
still inadequately funded by credit institutions by deposits (short term). 
Only 17.5% are funded through covered/mortgage bonds whilst 10.5% 
are funded through mortgage-backed securities (MBS),12 this percent-
ages should be increased to be able to avoid in the future the “lending 
long, borrowing short effect”.13 
–    Larger and more diversified mortgage pools. The geographical di-
versification is one of the most important types of diversification 
which exists within those pools of mortgage backing- be it the MBS or 
covered bonds. This is today, rather too complicated to be achieved at 
a Paneuropean level due to the low level of foreign mortgages that an 
EU credit institution has, mainly due to lack of a common mortgage 
instrument (the Eurohypothec).  
–    Greater diversity of mortgage products. There are still several juris-
dictions that lack specific mortgage funding instruments, either cov-
ered bonds, MBS or both.  
–   Desirable characteristics of the Paneuropean mortgage market: com-
pleteness, competitiveness, efficiency, transparency and stability. 
Completeness implies that every EU credit institution should possess 
                                                                                                                                                      
(UK), 2004, Ed. Gostick Hall for their study in Europe. 
11  See footnote 10 above for a reference to the mortgage funding system. 
12  See footnote 10 above for a reference to MBS and convered bonds. 
13  This effect causes mismatches due to liquidity and to different interest rates between 
the deposits and the issued mortgage securities (see the important crisis in the US dur-
ing the late 80s which caused the winding up of thousands of credit institutions due to 
this effect). See more details at Nasarre Aznar, Sergio, Securitisation & mortgage 
bonds. Legal aspects and harmonization in Europe, Saffron Walden (UK), 2004, Ed. 
Gostick Hall for their study in Europe. 
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the required facilities and capacity for choosing the mode of mort-
gage funding that it considers most appropriate; competitiveness re-
fers to a subordination of all barriers to facilitate negotiation of 
cross-border loans with mortgage loans (obviously, the Eurohy-
pothec should play an important role here); efficiency implies 
greater liquidity and product diversification, forgetting the importa-
tion of the US model of the Federal Agencies (Fannie Mae, Ginnie 
Mae and Freddie Mac)14, which have recently (2004) been revealed 
as inadequate for a healthy mortgage market, although there have 
been some attempts to create the European Mortgage Finance 
Agency; product diversification in passive operations markets is dif-
ficult to achieve in an environment in which there is scarcity of 
transnational mortgage business; transparency infers that mortgage 
securities’ legal and financial structures should be more comprehen-
sible both for investors (both professional and non-professional) and 
for rating agencies; in fact, this has been one of the most important 
reasons for the internationalization of mortgage market crisis of 
Summer 2007: lack of transparency of the real risks that were borne 
by investors in MBS backed by sub-prime US mortgages, such as 
European professional investors linked to banks, funds or insurance 
companies; and stability refers to a process whereby passive opera-
tions of mortgage markets should bring about a sufficient degree of 
risk diversification in the mortgage markets.  
–    Active operations: pre-payment rights? – the same issue that is ad-
dressed by the MICDG but this time, due to the lack of consumer’s 
participation in MFEG, clearer goals are achieved-; land valuation 
standards; flexibility of trans-national transfer of mortgages; efficient 
Land Register; efficient mortgage enforcement and consumer data pro-
tection.  
–    Passive operations: introduction of new legislations on covered 
bonds, to reduce risk in MBS pools and to create a truly Paneuropean 
market on mortgage securities. This is, of course, the ideal counterpart 
in the “passive side” for the Eurohypothec.  
                                                 
14  These are US Federal Agencies that, after buying good quality mortgages from lend-
ers (originators), issue MBS. For more details see Nasarre Aznar, Sergio, Securitisa-
tion & mortgage bonds. Legal aspects and harmonization in Europe, Saffron Walden 
(UK), 2004, Ed. Gostick Hall for their study in Europe. 
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Therefore, even if the White Paper 2007 of the EU on Mortgage Credit had not 
specifically mentioned the Eurohypothec, many of its principles and objectives 
would already be there. In essence, the creation of a true Paneuropean mort-
gage market cannot be achieved by addressing only the passive operations 
side.  
However, the White Paper 2007 referred to the Eurohypothec and to the 
Eurohypothec’s goals. The White Paper was released on 18-12-200715 and has 
addressed the following issues which relate directly to the topic of this work:  
a) The mortgage credit market represents 47% of the European Union GDP. 
Therefore it is an important area, which should be integrated. This inte-
gration has been calculated to allow for an increase of 0.7 % of the EU 
GDP.  
b) The EU Commission aims to facilitate the cross-border supply of mort-
gages (p. 3; bold is mine).  
c) The EU Commission aims to facilitate cross-border funding of mortgage 
credit. It literally states that: “The existence of differing legal and con-
sumer protection frameworks, fragmented infrastructures (e.g. credit reg-
isters), as well as the lack of appropriate legal frameworks in some in-
stances (e.g. for mortgage funding), create legal and economic barriers, 
which restrict cross-border lending and prevent the development of 
cost-efficient, pan-EU funding strategies. The Commission therefore 
seeks to remove disproportionate barriers, thus reducing the costs of sell-
ing mortgage products across the EU” (p. 3; bold is mine). It continues: 
“However, economic and legal barriers also exist which prevent mort-
gage lenders from offering certain products in certain markets or opt-
ing for a given funding strategy” (p. 3; bold is mine). Therefore, although 
it does not mention the Eurohypothec, it talks about the same goals that 
the latter pursues.  
d) As regards mortgage securitisation, it states that “The aim should be to 
facilitate, and not restrict, the development of a wide range of mortgage 
funding instruments” (p. 4; bold is mine). As regards the use of pan-
European mortgage loans to back covered bonds, it states that “the prohi-
bition of including non-domestic EU mortgage loans in cover pools for 
covered bonds, which currently exists in some Member States, is com-
patible with the free movement of capital and the freedom to provide ser-
vices” (p. 8). It envisages the creation of an Expert Group on Securitisa-
tion for 2008 (p. 9). The EU Commission refers to the same things we ad-
                                                 
15  COM(2007) 807 final. 
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dressed with Eurosecuritisation and the cross-border transfer of mortgage 
loans to back covered bonds.16  
e) The European Commission seeks to facilitate customers’ mobility “by 
ensuring that consumers seeking to change mortgage lenders are not pre-
vented or dissuaded from doing so as a result of the presence of unjustifi-
able legal or economic barriers”, thus avoiding “tying” practices (p. 5). 
See below new restrictions by Spanish Act 41/2007.  
f) The European Commission encourages member states to join EULIS, 
which is commented on below as a good complement to the Eurohy-
pothec: one cannot be fully understood without the other.  
g) As conclusion, it draws the following: “To be effective, any proposed 
measures must demonstrate that they will create new opportunities for 
mortgage lenders to access other markets and engage in cross-border 
activity. They should also demonstrate the capacity to facilitate a more 
efficient mortgage lending process, with economies of scale and scope, 
which should lower costs. The expected benefits should be weighed 
against the possible costs of these measures”.  
h) The Eurohypothec expressly appears in two Annexes of the White Paper:  
–   Annex 2: Process (Commission Staff Working Document-Accompa-
nying the White Paper on the Integration of EU Mortgage Credit 
Markets-Impact Assessment), which states that the Eurohypothec 
(referred to as “Euromortgage”) is a matter of study after the Green 
Paper 2005 release.  
–   Annex 3: Impact assessment on specific issues (Commission Staff 
Working Document-Accompanying the White Paper on the Integra-
tion of EU Mortgage Credit Markets-Impact Assessment, pp. 168 
and 169), in the field of transfer of mortgage portfolios, a solution 
would be “to issue a recommendation to Member States [...], to issue 
legislation or to create the ‘Eurohypothec’, as an alternative instru-
ment for securing loans on property to existing national concepts of 
collateral” (bold is mine) and recommends further research.  
As can be seen throughout this paper, the Eurohypothec is fully compliant with 
the objectives of the White Paper 2007 and the most appropriate instrument to 
achieve them.  
                                                 
16 See below. 
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3. Need for the Eurohypothec  
The creation of a complete European mortgage market would not necessarily 
require a common mortgage instrument if this lack could be compensated by 
suitable alternative instruments. However, such instruments are not effective. 
Figures reveal that currently, only 1% of European mortgage lending opera-
tions are being undertaken cross-border, which is really a low figure (Green 
Paper 2005). The inadequacy of the main instruments and tools of legal inte-
gration to achieve a single European mortgage market may be shown as fol-
lows: 
a) Mutual recognition. On the basis of the Cassis de Dijon decision of 
1979, unless a particular justification is given, no barriers can be imposed 
on free circulation of merchandise if safety control requirements have al-
ready been fulfilled in an EU country. Several cases which followed Cas-
sis de Dijon, like the Centros Case, Überseering and Inspire Art, have 
compelled EU Member States to accept other Member States corporative 
forms. However, the mutual recognition principle applied to the diversity 
of mortgages in Europe (for sure more than 27) would mean that every 
national mortgage (each of the at least 27), as they are governed by the lex 
rei sitae, would be valid (and should be able to be properly created) in 
every country, which would be completely chaotic for every jurisdiction 
(given the difficulty of integrating into one’s jurisdiction more than 26 
types of foreign mortgages).  
  In the field of mortgages, the most renowned case has been the Trummer 
and Mayer Case.17 Austria had put in place a prohibition to create mort-
gages referenced to a foreign currency to avoid the publicity of a not-
completely clear value of the mortgage (due to daily currency fluctua-
tions). The European Court of Justice considered this reason as insuffi-
ciently strong to prevent the application of free movement of capital. 
Only if a national mortgage system were affected in such a way that it did 
not assure the rights of mortgage lenders and third parties, would this 
measure be acceptable.  
b) Transposition into a minus. This principle implies that when a foreign 
right is incorporated into a national legal system, it should be applied in 
such a way that the legal quality and status of that right is not improved. 
However in the field of mortgages, this would mean that as regards a for-
eign mortgage, the mortgagee’s position would be worsened when it was 
incorporated into a national legal system.  
                                                 
17  (C-222/97) ECR 1999, I-1661. 
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4. The Idea behind the Eurohypothec  
The Eurohypothec model presented in the Basic Guidelines 2005 was con-
ceived as a secure, flexible Paneuropean instrument – which corresponds 
with the foundations of the White Paper 2007 on the integration of EU mort-
gage credit markets.  
a)  Security. The common core of all charges on land in Europe that may be 
used to secure obligations is that they can function as instruments ena-
bling land to be used as security with some kind of preference – a claim 
that may be raised by a secured creditor. Apart from this starting point 
(using the land to secure debts with some kind of privileged right), no fur-
ther common features may be found among any securing charge on land 
in Europe. The Eurohypothec should include this starting point in its 
foundations, however everything that is connected to it would appear un-
familiar to one or more legal jurisdictions (e.g. the contractual depend-
ence arising from the secured obligation/s is not familiar to almost every 
South-European country; the fact that the Eurohypothec is able to secure 
all types of obligations – including the non-monetary ones – would come 
as a surprise to many common law lawyers, etc.). However, it would be 
unreasonable to discontinue with this integration for this reason. The Eu-
rohypothec should be as minimally intrusive as possible to national ju-
risdictions but above every other thing, it should be as beneficial as pos-
sible both to lender and borrower (this is its main cornerstone). To be ef-
fective, the Eurohypothec should have the same privileged rank in terms 
of foreclosure anywhere in Europe. However this cannot easily be 
achieved in the second phase; therefore, a third phase is required, once a 
model has been agreed upon. This would be the optimal situation; if this 
solution could not be achieved, at least a Eurohypothec should still have 
the same rank as other national mortgages (with which it would coexist). 
Finally, an excellent partner for the Eurohypothec would be a common 
European Land Register. A first step in this direction would involve the 
European Land Information Service (EULIS) Project (www.eulis.org), 
which during its first stage (lasting till 2004), included two aspects: an 
on-line portal to access the already computerized national land registers 
and the “legal part” that includes definitions of legal institutions (in Eng-
lish) which are required to understand the legal situation of a plot of land 
(property, land charges, etc.) and their translation from one national lan-
guage to the other. In its current stage, EULIS is fully operational and 8 
national land registers and cadastres can be accessed through EULIS por-
tal. Plans currently exist to extend it to many other registers and cadastres. 
As currently conceived, EULIS would serve as a useful tool not only to 
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increase transnational land conveyancing, but also for the registration of 
land charges (lender can easily check from his home country for all legal 
and physical details of the land that is to be accepted as security for the 
loan they intend to grant), which should evolve to true European e-
conveyancing relating to land in future (in a similar way to what the Eng-
lish Land Registration Act 2002 foresees).  
b)  Flexibility. In order to be able to employ the Eurohypothec in every busi-
ness involving mortgages conceivable today (and many others that could 
be conceived in the future that require a flexible real estate security), it 
should be “released” from those legal ties which restrict its flexibility: its 
legal accessoriness to the secured obligations. The Eurohypothec, as a 
right, should be regarded as an entity (value, in economic terms) on its 
own, disregarding the purpose for which it is being used at a particular 
point in time: from the passive perspective of being a charge over land, it 
should evolve to the more active one of making value of land. Only in 
such case could the Eurohypothec be assigned separately from the se-
cured loan for funding purposes or would the borrower be able to reuse it 
for as many times as desired with the same or with a different lender. This 
should be understood as a general rule, which can be overlooked in some 
cases for consumer protection purposes (e.g. in the case where the lender 
assigns the Eurohypothec and the secured loan separately to two different 
third parties and both want foreclosure their rights against the borrower; 
in such a case, the latter should be entitled to invoke the relevant excep-
tions in order to avoid paying twice; this should be possible on the basis 
of the principle of unjust enrichment and on grounds of misbehaviour on 
the part of the lending institution.18  
c)  Paneuropean. This implies that the Eurohypothec should serve as a com-
mon instrument. It should be accessible throughout Europe and be capa-
ble of co-existing with other national types of mortgages. Based on what 
has already been said about its uses, flexibility and function as a security, 
finding an appropriate model for the Eurohypothec would be of great 
benefit. The following are, broadly speaking, the basic hypothecs models 
currently in force in Europe:  
– The continental accessory mortgage. This is the most widespread 
model type in Europe, which has prompted some authors (e.g. Wa-
chter19, Gómez Galligo20) to propose it as an ideal model for the Eu-
                                                 
18  See below. 
19  Wachter, Thomas, Die Eurohypothek-Grenzüberschreitende Kreditsicherung an 
Grundstücken im Europäischen Binnenmarkt, “Wertpapier Mitteilungen – Zeitschrift 
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rohypothec. It is present in almost every EU country but has disadvan-
tages in relation to the independent mortgage. These disadvantages are 
linked to its legal accessoriety with the secured loan. This means that 
anything which happens to the contractual relationship between lender 
and borrower would also affect the hypothec (e.g. no hypothec may 
exist without a securing loan; once the loan is extinguished so is the 
hypothec; their assignment must take place at the same time etc.). 
Moreover, authors supporting this idea do not provide any solutions to 
combine an accessory type of a Euromortgage with a Eurotrust.21  
– The continental European independent mortgage. It has its origins in 
Germany (Sicherungsgrundschuld) and Switzerland (Schuldbrief), but 
its use is widespread throughout the East-European countries such as 
Estonia (Hüpoteek), Poland (Dług na nieruchomoścì, still a project), 
Slovenia (Zemljišzi dolg) and Hungary (önálló zálogjog). Its advantage 
consists in being able to operate with any type of business and its dis-
advantage involves the hypothetical reduced protection for the bor-
rower.  
– The Scandinavian independent mortgage.22  
–  The common law “mortgage”, present in the UK and Ireland. Al-
though certain features exist that make the common law mortgage as 
flexible as the continental independent mortgage (ie. its virtue to adapt 
to any type of loans, the possibility of creating or conveying it in eq-
uity, that is, with less requirements than with its legal form), the point 
is that the mortgage itself belongs to a specific legal environment: the 
common law and equity. The Anglo-American legal system cannot be 
exported at this point because the fact that the mortgage entails a 3,000 
year lease – which is still so in its legal nature – cannot be understood 
abroad; moreover, the fact that the mortgage is, at the same time, a 
                                                                                                                                                      
für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht”, num. 2, January 1999, pp. 49 to 104. 
20  Gómez Galligo, Francisco Javier, La eurohipoteca: el sistema hipotecario español 
como modelo de referencia, “Estudios de derecho de obligaciones: homenaje al profe-
sor Mariano Alonso Pérez / coord. por Eugenio Llamas Pombo”, Vol. 1, 2006, pp. 
927-947. In the author’s opinion, the Spanish mortgage should serve as a model for 
the Eurohypothec. 
21  See below. 
22  For all relevant information on this type of land charge, see Jensen, Ulf, Panträtt i fast 
egendom, 6th Edition, 2001, Iustus. As a general idea, it may be stated that the Swed-
ish mortgage is an independent (from the loan) and quite simple (the whole system of 
registration and dealing) type of mortgage as compared to the majority of European 
models. 
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loan and a right in rem is also a difficult concept to understand outside 
Anglo-American systems because civil law countries have a model of 
rights in rem that secure contracts and other obligations.  
Against this background, it will be shown how the Eurohypothec model of the 
Basic Guidelines 2005 has adopted the most appropriate aspects of each of the 
stated models to achieve the maximum possible level of security and flexibil-
ity.  
5. Model of the Eurohypothec in the Basic Guidelines 2005  
Although an extensive study of the Eurohypothec model in the Basic Guide-
lines is still required, some related works have already been published.23 How-
ever, for now, we will only highlight the main features that help to build an 
operative concept of the Eurohypothec:  
A) Concerning the legal nature  
–    It is a real charge, which confers on its owner a preferential right over 
a piece of land (i.e. using it as a security for a loan(s)).  
–    It does not substitute national mortgages; it should coexist with them 
in each national jurisdiction. This is fully in compliance with the aim 
of the White Paper 2007 of increasing the mortgage products’ diver-
sity (p. 4).  
–    It is contractually dependent on the obligations it secures; it may not 
require any obligation to exist.  
–    To be used as a security, a security contract should exist. It should 
provide for minimum contents (which obligations to secure, use of the 
Eurohypothec, conditions for redemption and enforcement). Form: lex 
rei sitae and Art. 9 para. 6 Rome Convention 1980. 
–    Possibility for complete redemption (devolution) or a partial one.  
–    It does not generate interests; its constitution costs should be the same 
as those of national mortgages; the Eurohypothec extends to chattels 
and fruits of the land; it can be created in relation to any currency of 
the EU.  
                                                 
23  The most recent one is the translation of the Eurohypothec model of the Basic Guide-
lines into Spanish, while commenting some of its features: MUÑIZ, NASARRE y 
SÁNCHEZ JORDÁN, Un modelo para una Eurohipoteca. Desde el Informe Segré 
hasta hoy, Cuadernos de Derecho Registral, Madrid, 2008, Colegio de Registradores 
de la Propiedad y Mercantiles de España. 
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B) Constitution  
–    Only the owner of the land can create it, with or without the interven-
tion of the creditor.  
–    It must be registered in the Land Register to exist (amount, owner and 
form).  
–    It can adopt two forms: “register Eurohypothec” and “letter Eurohy-
pothec”. It can be managed electronically.  
–    Object: any land in Europe and any other immovable object, accord-
ing to lex rei sitae.  
–    “Trans-national eurohypothecs” and “multi-parcel eurohypothecs”.  
–    It is possible to hold a Eurohypothec or part of it on trust for another. 
C) Transfer  
–    It will depend on the way it has been created: if it is a “register” Euro-
hypothec, transfer will be done through the Land Register; if it is a 
“letter” Eurohypothec, this will be done only by the delivery of the let-
ter to the transferee.  
–    The Eurohypothec can be conveyed independently of the secured 
obligation to a different third party.  
–    The debtor can oppose real pleas and objections against the trans-
feree. Therefore, the security contract should have their party effect; if 
this were not possible, the tort liability of the transferor might be an al-
ternative.  
D) Extinction  
–    It is extinguished through cancellation in the Land Register, as a re-
sult of an agreement between the owner and, in its case, the creditor.  
–    It is not extinguished through passage of time.  
–    The fulfilment of a secured obligation does not imply its extin-
guishment; its effects will be determined in the security agreement.  
E) Enforcement  
–    Its efficacy depends on the process and duration of its enforcement 
(max.12 months)  
–    The Eurohypothec is an enforceable title in itself (lex rei sitae) + con-
stitutes an enforceable claim against the owner (Schuldverprechen) (lex 
rei sitae; that is, only in those jurisdictions in which this is allowed).  
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–    It should end through sale at a public auction (interdiction of the 
droit de voie parée – briefly explain what this is).  
–    In the case of pleas and objections, the burden of proof lies with the 
owner of the Eurohypothec.  
–    Higher ranked rights stand still; those with the same or a less good 
rank are extinguished; there is the possibility of the substitution of the 
mortgagee, replacing him and occupying his rank  
–    Insolvency. Same security as in enforcement. Possibility of separate 
enforcement.  
–    An efficient Land Register is required: public charges need to be reg-
istrable, with their rank and publicity being ensured 
–    Implementation. The Eurohypothec constitutes a model solution 
which might be turned in an optional 28th regime.  
6. Questions about the model  
According to our experience and feed-backs we have received, several ques-
tions have arisen whenever the model was explained.24  
–    Lack of economic studies. If the implementation of the Eurohypothec 
is a rather long and difficult endeavour, one might call for empirical 
evidence to show in advance if it is a worthwhile process, economi-
cally speaking. However, working on the assumption that one common 
single instrument is better than having at least 27 different ones, might 
also be defendable. In this context, the White Paper 2007 (p. 13) re-
quires that any new measures “should demonstrate that they will create 
new opportunities for mortgage lenders”, although it already includes 
several observations that illustrate the benefits of the integration of 
mortgage markets (pp. 3 to 5).  
–    The proposed “contractually dependent mortgage” is generally un-
known in Europe: this could generate concerns. In addition, some 
might argue that the already existing legally dependent mortgages are 
flexible enough. In addition, two further concerns are often voiced: 
first, the Eurohypothec, as foreseen in the Basic Guidelines of 2005, 
would not be able to operate in causal jurisdictions, that is, in jurisdic-
                                                 
24  See a discussion about pros and cons of the Eurohypothec at European Bank for re-
construction and development, Mortgages in transition economies. The legal frame-
work for mortgages and mortgage securities, United Kingdom, 2007. 
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tions where the “causa” is a relevant requirement for a valid legal 
transaction (Rechtsgeschäft); second, a separate transfer of the obliga-
tion to a first third party and the mortgage (Eurohypothec) to a second 
one is alleged to place the borrower in a difficult situation, as he would 
then have to face two different claims. However, neither of both 
statements is true.  
i. Causa and accessoriness. Elaborated in depth elsewhere,25 Figure 1 shows 
those differences which exist between both: the causa refers to the obligation to 
create a security real right (or to use an already existing one) to guarantee an obli-
gation/s (pactum de hipothecando: the obligation of the mortgagor to create or 
employ a mortgage to guarantee certain obligation/s) while the accessoriness, al-
though there are many types, refers to the link and grade of dependency between 
the security right and the obligation/s, that is, what happens to the security right 
when the obligation is transferred, diminished, or extinguished.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Causa and accessoriness.  
ii. Risk (for the borrowers) of a separate transfer of the mortgage and the 
loan. Although this may be possible only if agreed between the borrower and 
mortgagor in the security contract, it would be necessary in some way to allow 
a Euro-securitization process through a Eurotrust,26 that is, the secured loan 
                                                 
25 See Nasarre Aznar, Sergio and Stöcker, Otmar, Un pas més en la „mobilització de la 
hipoteca: la naturaleza i la configuración jurídica d’una hipoteca independent, „Re-
vista Catalana de Dret Privat“, Vol I, 2002, Barcelona, 2002. 
26  See below. 
 19 
alone should be able to be transferred to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) – 
that which issues the MBS – while the Eurohypothec itself would be held by 
the original mortgagee on trust for the SPV. Therefore the normal case would 
be that the original mortgagee would retain the Eurohypothec and would only 
transfer the loan for mortgage funding purposes, and this is what would be 
agreed between the mortgage loan parties. However, it is possible that the 
original mortgagee transfers the loan to a first third party and conveys the Eu-
rohypothec to another, although this can be agreed against in the security con-
tract; but in case it has been not, this situation may compel the mortgagor to 
face two possible claims (one from the transferee of the claim an the other 
from the transferee of the Eurohypothec). See the scheme in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Debtor’s risk facing two claims: from the lender and from the mortgagor  
However, the debtor/mortgagor would be able to use all pleas and exceptions 
to protect himself (see Basic Guidelines 2005), especially, that which states 
that he has already paid the loan, so he can stop the enforcement of the Euro-
hypothec. In any case, he would not have to pay twice and states should ensure 
this by any mechanisms (either legal or contractual).  
–    A third criticism builds on the argument that many different fields of 
law would become affected. Whilst this is true, it should however be 
noted that the necessary changes would be carried out spontaneously by 
national legislators to improve their national forms of Eurohypothecs. If 
a jurisdiction has a defective enforcement system that prevents speedy 
full recovery of the borrowed amount to the lender, few or more expen-
sive (higher interest rates and worse conditions) Eurohypothecs would 
be granted in that country when compared with other jurisdictions with 
better enforcement procedures. The same would happen with the insol-
vency context, the efficacy of the Land Register and all “soft law” that 
has been explained in the previous point, letter E.  
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–    A forth query refers to the scope of the Eurohypothec: Should it be al-
lowed only in the context of international transactions or also in domes-
tic operations? Nothing should restrict the use of the Eurohypothec in 
domestic operations, if it would produce beneficial results for the par-
ties involved. It should be presented as another option to them, separate 
from their national security rights on real estate. Should it be applicable 
only to professional lenders or also to non-professional lenders? This 
argument is not surprising to see in several national jurisdictions in 
which some security rights are only recommended for professional and 
controlled use (like the Grundschuld in Germany) or even legally lim-
ited to their use (the new hipoteca recargable in Spain). In principle, the 
desirable scope of the Eurohypothec should be as wide as possible, but 
this question, too, could be left to national parliaments.  
–    Fifth, one might ask whether the EU has the legislative competence of 
the EU to implement a Eurohypothec?  
Under primary legislation, it is clear that the Eurohypothec is linked to the free 
movement of capital and people, which nowadays can only be achieved by an 
action of the EU, to which it is legitimated by art. 3b.3 EU Treaty. While the 
reference to free movement of capital is rather clear (trans-national active and 
passive mortgage operations will result in a Paneuropean movement of capital 
in relation to real estate), that which refers to people, implies the possibility of 
people easily financing their houses in another EU country from a national 
bank, not only for second-residences but also for geographical mobility of 
workers. They would be able to plan their movements abroad thus contracting 
with their national banks (theoretically with better conditions) in matters relat-
ing to the financing of their new house abroad.  
The specific references in the Treaty of the European Union last amended by 
the Treaty of Lisbon 13-12-2007:27 Art. 2.2 (freedom of movement and resi-
dence), internal market and economic union (arts. 2.3 and 2.4) and art. 6.1 which 
gives the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7-12-200028 
last amended on 12-12-200729 the same legal value as the Treaties. In fact, it is 
this Charter that refers to the fundamental rights of property (art. 17.1), familiar, 
home and private life (art. 7), consumers’ protection (Art. 38), help to families 
(art. 33.1), free movement and residence (art. 45), free movement of workers 
(art. 15) and, in general, the Charter of Rights seeks the “free movement of per-
sons, services, goods and capital, and the freedom of establishment” (Preamble).  
                                                 
27  Official Journal the European Union, 2007/C 306/01, Vol. 50, 17-12-2007. 
28  Official Journal the European Union, C 364/1, 18-12-2000. 
29  Official Journal of the European Union, C 303/15, 14-12-2007. 
 21 
In order to avoid too much intrusion in national laws, consideration of the 
application of the Eurohypothec as a “28th regime” seems to be a feasible so-
lution.  
The role of the trust in several civil law contexts is still in doubt. As we 
will see in the next part, the Eurotrust is an essential complement for the Euro-
hypothec.  
II. The Eurohypothec and the Eurotrust  
1. Introduction  
Many financial operations do not take place internationally because they are 
too complex, expensive or, simply, impossible. The reasons may vary, but 
many of them are related not only to the lack of a common mortgage instru-
ment in Europe (credit institutions do not wish to face the risk of granting a 
mortgage that implies the application of a foreign law, according to the appli-
cable lex rei sitae), but also due to the lack of an instrument that would provide 
clear and simple structures in many mortgage operations: a pan-European fidu-
ciary instrument, which may be called “Eurotrust”.  
Broadly speaking, in many possible businesses with the Eurohypothec the trus-
tee would be the holder of the Eurohypothec and the beneficiaries would be 
those lenders whose credits would be fiduciary secured by that Eurohypothec, 
thus avoiding many costs, time and legal complications. In the following 
points the concept and the uses of the Eurotrust are explained in more detail. 
2. Concept of the Eurotrust  
Although possibly with a misleading denomination (the Eurotrust is not related 
to the international Trust of The Hague Trust Convention 1985, but uses the 
term “Euro” because of its close relationships with the “Eurohypothec”, and 
the term “trust” because it entails both obligational and real (fiduciary) effects, 
that is the isolation of assets from their holder), the Eurotrust has been con-
ceived30 as a complement to the Eurohypothec. This is so because the Euro-
hypothec, as a result of its legal nature as a contractually dependent real 
charge, is rendered more effective by the Eurotrust. It is a means of achieving 
                                                 
30  It was first referred to in Nasarre Aznar, Sergio and Stöcker, Otmar, Eurohypothec 
and Eurotrust. Future Elements of a Pan-European Mortgage Market, at „Innovation 
in Securitisation. Yearbook 2006“, Jan Job de Vries Robbé and Paul Ali (coords.), 
The Hague, 2006, Ed. Kluwer Law International. 
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greater flexibility in the link between credit and mortgage, allowing the fact 
that lender and mortgagee could be different persons, without losing security.  
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate how lender and mortgagee could easily be differ-
ent people thanks to the Eurotrust.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 3 & 4. Legal and fiduciary relationship between lender and mortgagee.  
As a result, the Eurotrust would prove beneficial to any business requiring an 
efficient division between loan and mortgage :  
Active operations: all those relating to the existence of several lenders un-
der the same Eurohypothec  
–    Partial redemption of loan A and new taking of loan B (see White 
Paper 2007, p. 5, about the desire to improve consumers’ mobility 
among lending institutions)  
–    Total redemption and reuse of Eurohypothec without loan (see the 
same idea at White Paper 2007, p. 5).  
–    Syndicate mortgage lending.31  
Passive operations: 
–    The acquisition of mortgage loans European-wide for purposes of 
pooling them to issue covered bonds (art. 22 UCITS Directive) or 
simply using other credit institutions’ mortgages (held on trust) to 
secure one’s covered bonds issuances (see White Paper 2007, p. 3).  
–    Creating international pools of mortgages for securitisation purposes  
In consequence, the Eurotrust combined with the Eurohypothec allows for the 
restructure of all businesses (useful for lenders and borrowers) that involve a 
split between mortgage and loan. Among other uses of the Eurohypothec 
                                                 
31  See its concept below. 
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itself due to its Paneuropean nature, it ensures that:  
–    During the obligation, the loan/s is permanently secured by the 
mortgage held by another, which is enforceable where the security 
agreement states so.  
–    In case of insolvency of the mortgage holder, the mortgage (Eurohy-
pothec) should be treated as an alien property (and therefore not in-
cluded in the insolvent’s insolvency estate).  
3. Uses of the Eurotrust  
A) Ongoing syndication  
This type of financial operation is commonly used to fund a project, which ei-
ther entails an important grade of financial risk – ie. of default – or involves a 
huge disbursement of economic resources, or both. In these two situations, a 
single lender is faced with so many inconveniences in funding the project that 
he is simply not prepared to do it alone. Therefore, he requires the bor-
rower/mortgagor to find – or finds by himself – other lenders that may be in-
terested in sharing the risk/disbursement. If new lenders have entered the rela-
tionship since the beginning of the operation, it is called an “initial” syndicate 
lending. However, where those new lenders enter at a moment different from 
the initial one (when the financial operation was prepared), it is known as an 
“ongoing” syndication.  
This difference is relevant to the usefulness of the Eurohypothec. Although 
it can be used in both situations, it is in the “ongoing” syndication where it 
plays a more important role, as it optimises this type of syndication or even al-
lows it in legal contexts where it is not possible. Where it functions as an “ini-
tial” syndication, the operation can be organised through a common mortgage 
securing a loan in which the active side constitutes several lenders (joint and 
several credit). If nothing changes during the life of the project – that is, no 
new lenders come – the operation is properly structured. However, problems 
arise when new lenders come into the relationship – or where simply it was 
planned only for a single lender and a second or other ones are later added – 
who also want to be secured by the same mortgage. Ongoing lenders under a 
syndication are not comfortable when they are assigned second and further 
mortgages on the charged land. Depending on the concrete costs and in con-
texts where a split between mortgagee and lender is not possible (accessory 
mortgages), there are only two solutions, neither of which is optimal: either the 
mortgagor grants further mortgages to the newcomers – which makes the 
whole operation more expensive and even impossible, because this situation is 
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not desired by new lenders under a syndication –; or the first mortgage rela-
tionship is modified (novation) in the Land Register, which may involve, in 
some contexts, the extinction of the first mortgage and the creation of a brand 
new one (extinctive novation). However, even if it is only a modificative nova-
tion, the need for reformulation of the whole first mortgage loan, makes the 
operation more complicated and expensive.  
 
 
Figure 5. The syndication with the Eurohypothec & the Eurotrust  
With the Eurohypothec and the Eurotrust, the ongoing syndication can be un-
dertaken in an optimal way (see Figure 5 above): while the Eurohypothec al-
lows for a split between mortgagee and lender, it is allowing the possibility of 
several lenders being secured by the same mortgage, either since the beginning 
of the relationship or in an ongoing syndication. However this is not enough, 
as no assurance is provided to the second and subsequent lenders that they are 
properly secured with the first single Eurohypothec with a simple contractual 
relationship between lender 2/3/etc. and the borrower and with another con-
tract between lender 2/3/etc. and lender 1. 
Because:  
1) The “security contract” between lender 2/3/etc. and the borrower and 
lender 1, will only be enforceable between them, given the nature of a con-
tract. Once lender 1 conveys the Eurohypothec, the assignee is not obliged 
to respect that contract (it does not affect him) and therefore, lender 2/3/etc. 
will no longer be secured by the Eurohypothec.  
2) Even if lender 1 does not assign the Eurohypothec, the same problem can 
take place if lender 1 becomes insolvent and therefore the Eurohypothec 
will be included in his active estate. The same happens if lender 1 has re-
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mortgaged the Eurohypothec (i.e. Sub-Eurohypothec) and a single en-
forcement is carried out by the owner of that sub-Eurohypothec. In both 
cases, lender 2/3/etc. will lose their contractual rights before the creditors 
of lender 1, who will be entitled to enforce or, (in case of insolvency) re-
cover from, the Eurohypothec.  
If the Eurotrust comes into play, it is now clear that the Eurohypothec is secur-
ing second and further lenders not only on the basis of an agreement between 
them and lender 1 and the security contact signed with the mortgagor, but also 
as a result of the agreement producing erga omnes effects, fiduciary effects 
through the fiduciary arrangement between lender 1 and subsequent lenders: 
from then on, the unaffected part of the Eurohypothec -that is, the part that has 
not been used to secure any loan at all, either because it never existed or be-
cause the mortgagor has partially repaid it- is going to cover lender 2/3/etc. al-
though the Eurohypothec is still held by lender 1, both for himself -for the 
amount of his own loan- and for the other lenders –in amounts corresponding 
to each of the others’ loans. This erga omnes fiduciary effect, will result in that 
part of the Eurohypothec that is securing other lenders’ loans, being considered 
as an alien property, both in enforcement cases and, especially, in cases deal-
ing with the insolvency of the first lender. In this latter case, the Eurohypothec 
will partially be conveyed to other lenders in most EU jurisdictions as it is con-
sidered an alien property, different from the property of the insolvent lender 1.  
B)  Preventing tying practices  
One of the most interesting advantages that the Eurohypothec would present to 
borrowers is greater freedom -understood as a de-link with a single lending 
institution (in accordance to White Paper 2007, pp. 5, 9, 10 and 11) and the 
possibility of dealing with several of them at the same time (i.e. taking differ-
ent loans from each one and securing all of them with the same Eurohypothec). 
This is in addition to other type of borrowers’ tying: the geographical one.  
a) Geographical ties. Because the Eurohypothec would help to create a 
true Paneuropean mortgage market, the competition among lending institu-
tions would no longer exist only on a national basis but also at European level. 
With the development of new technologies, there are currently no restrictions 
or technical problems for consumers based anywhere in Europe in logging on 
to the internet, checking all mortgage offers offered by any European lending 
institution and calculating which is best for him, taking into account that the 
lending institution is willing and ready to grant the mortgage disregarding the 
location of the land that is to be purchased and used as security, thanks to the 
Eurohypothec. However, this is still not enough, because the lending institu-
tion should be aware of the physical and legal situation of the land, whose pur-
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chase it is funding. This can only be achieved by the so-called “Euro-land reg-
ister”, which is not a reality yet, but where advances and work have proceeded 
on the already fully-functional European Land Information System (EULIS) 
project. As mentioned earlier, this project facilitates the possibility of checking 
cadastres and land registers of eight European countries through a single por-
tal, EULIS, together with a thesaurus that tries to address terminological ques-
tions and definitions of charges in different jurisdictions.  
b) The Eurohypothec should be seen as a value on land, that is, a means of 
negotiating with one’s land value without conveying the land. The Eurohy-
pothec, according to the Basic Guidelines, has been conceived more as value 
on land than as a charge. This conception implies in the first place that the Eu-
rohypothec’s negotiability should always remain in hands of the mortgagor, 
disregarding in whose hands the Eurohypothec is at different moments. This 
entails the possibility of disposal of the Eurohypothec by the mortgagor at any 
time, as soon as he has repaid the debt it had been securing. This can be con-
cretized in three important aspects:  
a. Complete subrogation  
Regardless of the grounds (ie. the better the interest rates of the second lender, 
better treatment with other loans, etc.), the mortgagor – on the grounds of the 
special protection he deserves as a consumer (see, in this sense, White Paper 
2007, p. 5) – should be able to change his lender, once he has repaid the first 
mortgage. Through the subrogation, Bank B pays the debt which the 
debtor/mortgagor has with Bank A with funds from the new loan it is granting 
the debtor/mortgagor in exchange of the mortgage he had granted the first 
lender. No change is required as regards the mortgage to ensure the complete 
success of this new operation. A private loan arrangement with the second 
lender is sufficient.  
 
Figure 6. Scheme of complete subrogation of Bank B in Bank A  
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b. Reuse of the Eurohypothec by the borrower  
Even when the borrower has fulfilled his obligations to the lender, the Eurohy-
pothec is not extinguished (as it would under an accessory regime) and does 
not, therefore, need to be cancelled in the Land Register. Once the loan(s) is 
fully repaid, the mortgagor recovers the Eurohypothec and it does not consoli-
date with the ownership of the land, in conformity with what is usually agreed 
in the security contract. Instead, it can be kept by the mortgagor until he re-
quires it once again for other purposes, such as the purchase of another house 
or to take advantage of credits for other purposes under the Eurohypothec, like 
loans for holidays, cars, etc. As a result, there is no need to cancel the first one 
and create a new one thereafter, thus saving time and money.  
c. Reducibility and partial reuse  
One of those rights of the mortgagor which illustrates the involvement of the 
Eurohypothec is exemplified in the possibility of reducing it whenever it is 
over-securing the loan in comparison to the over-collateralization that was 
agreed at the time the mortgage loan was granted (in relation to the loan-to-
value ratio, LTV). That is, if the land is valued at €100, the mortgage on it may 
be arranged at, let us assume, €100 (therefore the land is charged for its whole 
value), while the loan would be €80, that is, with overcollateralisation of 20%. 
At the very moment the debtor pays the first instalment, the overcollaterali-
sation is increased, which means that in practice, the lender is benefiting from 
an increasing overcollateralisation for free, without compensating the borrower 
who is witness to his land being increasingly and unnecessarily overcharged: if 
the lender had agreed to grant a loan of 80€ with a mortgage coverage of only 
€100, why should he be entitled after each instalment to be increasingly more 
secured (with an increased value of mortgage overcollateralisation) without 
any compensation for the borrower? These are overcollateralized loans (with a 
value, an asset, the mortgage itself, that in fact belongs to the mortgagor) from 
which the lenders are unduly making profits (unjust enrichment) i.e. with the 
issuance of mortgage securities. On this ground, several jurisdictions like 
Germany allow the mortgagor to unilaterally reduce the mortgage in the Land 
Register (like Germany, at §§ 1144 and 1145 BGB), while others forbid it on 
the principle that the mortgage is indivisible (i.e. in Spain, art. 122 LH).  
According to rules of the Basic Guidelines which relate to the Eurohy-
pothec, the mortgagor will therefore act with the released part of the mortgage 
according to the clauses in the security agreement: he would either cancel the 
mortgage partially in the Land Register or simply reuse it with the same or 
with another lender to secure another loan with him. Figure 7 shows this sec-
ond possibility.  
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Figure 7. Partial cancellation and partial reuse of the Eurohypothec 
C) Eurohypothec’s securitization  
Another benefit of the Eurohypothec to lenders is the creation of a truly pan-
European mortgage securities’ market, that is, the possibility of using Eurohy-
pothecs from all around Europe as assets to be securitized on a European-wide 
basis. Instead of pooling a wide range of commonly unknown securities on 
land (ie. in Spain, apart from the so-called participaciones hipotecarias, which 
are securities that are unique in Europe and quite insecure from a legal point of 
view as they “financially simulate” the assignment of mortgages, no mortgages 
are pooled for securitization purposes; in France, mortgages are conveyed only 
through a so-called bordereau de cession; in England, equitable mortgages are 
usually pooled;32 in Germany, until 2005 with the creation of the fiduciary Re-
finanzierungsregister, no securitization was possible, resulting in uncertainty 
for investors (and this is necessarily one of the reasons why mortgage securiti-
zation is not done nowadays at Europea-wide level), a single and known mort-
gage instrument/security on land could be pooled: the Eurohypothec. Although 
at a second stage, Eurohypothecs granted in different countries would have dif-
ferent grades of risk, as mentioned, because of the legal environment in each 
jurisdiction – which includes factors such as the efficacy of the Land Register, 
the insolvency and enforcement regulations, etc. – the instrument would re-
quire acknowledgement from investors and they could demand a proper (and 
compensatory to risk) interest rate revenue, according to the amount of Euro-
hypothecs present in the pool coming from France, Germany, Spain, Poland, 
Romania, etc., whereby risks can be calculated (and compensated inside the 
                                                 
32  See Nasarre Aznar, Sergio, Securitisation & mortgage bonds. Legal aspects and har-
monization in Europe, Saffron Walden (UK), 2004, Ed. Gostick Hall, for the partici-
paciones hipotecarias, the borederau de cession and the equitable assignment of 
mortgages in the UK. 
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covering pool) accordingly.  
Apart from creating such a Paneuropean securitization market (“Eurosecuri-
tisation”, it could be called), the Eurohypothec would help to develop and 
compensate housing and mortgage markets all over Europe. Thus, if a national 
mortgage market lacks liquidity (that is, its lending institutions have been 
caught in a “lending long-borrowing short” crisis), their liquidity would come 
from an international pool of Eurohypothecs – selling to them those credits se-
cured by the Eurohypothecs – thus increasing the possibility of attracting for-
eign investors at better rates due to the risk compensation that would operate 
inside the pool, which would be created by Eurohypothecs from all over 
Europe (geographical risk diversification). See this structure in Figure 8.  
Figure 8. The Eurosecurisation 
The Eurosecuritisation process is technically feasible with the Eurohypothec 
because the Eurohypothec allows, through the Eurotrust, a secure split of the 
lender from the mortgagee. A common problem for all securitisation processes 
in civil-law jurisdictions has been how to convey in a secure and efficient way, 
thousands of mortgage loans. The mortgages in those countries -this is also 
true for legal mortgages in common law jurisdictions and this is why an equi-
table transfer to the SPV is used – are extremely “heavy” to convey, in terms 
of time and costs. The Eurohypothec resolves this issue in a legally-friendly 
way (avoiding the conception of creatures such as the participaciones hipote-
carias or the bordereau de cession)33 allowing only the transfer of the secured 
loans -which can be achieved through a private contract – whilst, at the same 
                                                 
33  For comments, see Nasarre Aznar, Sergio, Securitisation & mortgage bonds. Legal 
aspects and harmonization in Europe, Saffron Walden (UK), 2004, Ed. Gostick Hall. 
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time, allowing the originator of the mortgage loans to retain the Eurohypothecs 
on trust (Eurotrust) for the SPV34 (the new “lender” or owner of the loans). 
Thus, all loans owned by the SPV – the issuer of the mortgage-backed securi-
ties – are at every moment fiduciarily covered by their respective Eurohy-
pothecs, still held by originators. This is especially relevant in cases where the 
originators become insolvent. In such cases, Eurohypothecs would consolidate 
with the loans within the jurisdiction of SPVs, as they would be treated as alien 
property (property of the SPV).  
D) Using other credit institution’s Eurohypothecs for issuing covered 
bonds  
The most frequently used mortgage finance instrument in Europe is the mort-
gage bond (also known as “covered bond”, when it includes funding of loans 
granted to public institutions). Although for its issuance, the transfer of the 
mortgage bond to any SPV is not required (unlike MBS, the default risk in 
covered bonds is assumed by the originator of mortgages, as covered bonds 
represent debt to them), the problem remains similar: there is no European 
mortgage bond market (issuance of covered bonds backed by mortgages 
granted over land in a foreign country) because of, first, the low trans-national 
mortgage lending and, second, the lack of trans-national mortgage transfer due 
to the “burden” of transferring mortgages (for the same reasons explained 
above) together with the uncertainty of the legal environment (directly linked 
to the efficacy) that surround each national mortgage. The Eurohypothec 
would banish all these doubts in relation to the legal working of mortgages in 
Europe while the Eurotrust would facilitate the easy transfer of mortgages, in 
the same way as has been explained above.  
E) The multi-parcel Eurohypothec  
The Paneuropean dimension of the Eurohypothec’s most relevant example is 
the multi-parcel Eurohypothec, shown in Figure 9. Its main feature is reflected 
in its capability of admitting as security for a loan (or several loans), several 
pieces of land located in different EU countries.  
                                                 
34  See footnote 10 above for the explanation of the SPV. 
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Figure 9. The Multi-parcel Eurohypothec.  
III. Real case: Spanish mortgage reforms 2007  
1. General overview of the Spanish mortgage reform 2007  
Through Act 41/2007 7 December,35 Spain has reformed its legislation on 
mortgages. It is perhaps, the biggest reform since 1946 and 1981, dealing with 
the two faces of the mortgage market: active operations (regulated in Mortgage 
Act 1946) and passive operations (regulated in Mortgage Market Act 1981). In 
relation to the first one, measures are taken to give more transparency to the 
mortgage lending pre-contractual and contractual information to the borrower; 
the Act wants to ensure the independence of the land valuation companies in or-
der to avoid improper practices that have taken place the leas 10 or 12 years 
(some lending institutions have created their own land valuation companies to 
obtain valuations more adequate to their own interests); it also makes more 
transparent the mortgage loan pre-payment fees for borrowers; the notarial and 
land registrars’ fees are reduced; and “updated” types of mortgages are regulated 
like the hipoteca de máximo or the hipoteca recargable (to allow more secure 
transactions with different loans covered with the same mortgage).36 And in re-
lation to the second one, another legal configuration is given to the Spainsh 
bonos hipotecarios (a useless mortgage security which I fear it would remain 
useless after the reform as they are deprived from their unique advantage in rela-
tion to the cédulas: their strong security) while the assets that can cover the 
cédulas are enarged (not only mortgages but also other liquid and secure assets). 
                                                 
35  BOE 8-12-2007, num. 294, p. 50593. 
36  See below for more details.  
 32 
But in any case, this reform should be contextualized in the light of a wave 
of reforms in the European context in relation to the improvement of the mort-
gage market: France (the already quoted Ordonnance 23-3-2006 for mortgages 
and the Loi 2007-211, 19-2-200737 about the trust (fiducie)) and Germany 
(GNBSR 200538). It should be also understood in the line of improvements in 
national legislations following the publication of the Basic Guidelines 2005, 
which included the benefits of a Eurohypothec (uses that a Eurohypothec 
should be capable of).  
As a starting point, it should be pointed out that the Spanish mortgage re-
form has improved, in the way already seen (more flexibility for mortgage 
lending and with mortgage securities), Spanish mortgage efficiency both in ac-
tive and in passive operations. Yet, in the light of what has been said so far, 
further improvements would be necessary to meet the goals proposed by the 
White Paper of 2007:  
a) Greater flexibility for lenders  
In this sense, Spain offers not only the possibility of creating a mortgage to se-
cure lines of credit (art. 153 LH), but also that of creating a rechargeable mort-
gage (art. 13.2 Act 41/2007). While these instruments are not yet present in 
every European jurisdiction (i.e. Romania and Bosnia), the Eurohypothec 
would make this a possibility.  
b) Greater flexibility for borrowers  
i. The possibility for borrowers to change their lending institutions in a reason-
able cheap way has been a reality in Spain since Act 2/1994 (art. 2). However, 
the Reform of 2007 has limited this possibility in an important way, following 
the Resolution of the Spanish High Court 25-11-2003, which is commented on 
below. As a result of the reform, mortgagors are no longer able to change their 
credit institution if the first credit institution makes the same offer as the sec-
ond one. As long as the reasons provided for changing credit institutions would 
be of any type (i.e. the first one has denied the borrower an extra loan while the 
second one would grant it to him), this is an important new limitation to mort-
gagors’ rights, which goes against what would be desirable in the whole of 
Europe. In the context of this new situation, borrowers could be tied to the 
same lender for as long as such lender would like to retain him, taking into 
consideration that all further loans must necessarily be granted by the same 
lending institution if the borrower wanted to cover them under the mortgage, 
                                                 
37  JORF 21-2-2007. 
38  Gesetz zur Neuorganisation der Bundesfinanzverwaltung und zur Schaffung eines Re-
finanzierungsregisters 2005 (GNBSR), BGBl 27-9-2005, Part I, pp. 2809-2819. 
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as the Spanish mortgage does not allow the separate co-existence of lender and 
mortgagee. The high costs of changing a mortgage lender, in situations beyond 
the scope of Act 2/1994, would discourage the borrower from changing the 
original lender.  
ii. In relation to the possibility of partial reuse of the mortgage, Spain does not 
allow it on the basis of Arts. 668.3 LEC and 236f.4 RH.  
c) Eurosecuritisation and efficient systems of mortgage transfers  
Because the nature of Spanish participaciones hipotecarias has not been al-
tered and clarified, the Spanish Mortgage Market Reform 2007 has not helped 
to achieve the so-called Eurosecuritisation.39 In relation to an efficient – and of 
course, civil law-friendly – system of mortgage transfer, this has even been 
worsened following the introduction of the Spanish Reform 2007, with the new 
redaction given to art. 149 LH by art. 11.3 of Act 41/2007.  
Until the reform, it was clear to jurisprudence that none of the requirements 
established in art. 149 LH (giving notice to debtor, notarial deed and registra-
tion in Land Register) were necessary for the operation of a mortgage loan 
conveyance, disregarding the misleading redaction of that article; therefore, the 
redaction of art. 149 LH was afforded more flexibility. However with the new 
text, the legislator introduces yet again the word “deberá” (must) which im-
plies that any transfer of mortgages must be carried out through notarial deed 
and registration. The problematic unnecessarily returns.  
a) Free mortgage loans’ syndication. Because of the legal accessoriness of the 
Spanish mortgage, even after the reform of 2007, efficient (without altering the 
mortgage) and ongoing syndications are not possible.  
b) A Euro-Land Register, together with a Paneuropean recognized title to reg-
ister.The Spanish mortgage reform: 1) does not allude to any possible step 
forward the European integration of Land Registration services; 2) it does not 
try to prevent resolutions like the RDGRN 2-7-2005 (explained below) that 
prevents the efficacy of foreign notarial deeds in Spain, which goes against the 
European law; and, finally, the reform does not support the incorporation of 
Spain to EULIS. As can be seen, the White Paper 2007 explicitly supports the 
Project EULIS (p. 8) and for 2008 a recommendation on land registration is 
expected (p. 11). 
c) A Paneuropean mortgage solution, merely based on the title of the White 
Paper 2007: “Integration of EU Mortgage Credit Markets” and the requirement 
that any change should lead to the creation of new opportunities for cross-
                                                 
39  See the problematic at Annex 3 White Paper 2007, p. 167. 
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border mortgage activity. The Spanish reform is not thinking in pushing for-
ward the integration of the European mortgage market, which is not acceptable 
for a piece of legislation which has been elaborated in a parallel way to the EC 
White Book 2007. 
 
Europe demands 
(including White 
Paper 2007) 
Spain (Mortgage Act 1946, Act 
2/1994 and Act 41/2007) 
European panorama Eurohy-
pothec(Basic 
Guidelines) 
+ LENDER’S 
FLEXIBILITY 
Lines of credit: yes, (art. 153 LH) 
Recharchable mortgage: yes (art. 
13.2 Act 41/2007 that modifies art. 
4 Act 2/1994) 
Not a reality in every country 
(Romania, Bosnia) 
Possible, without 
restrictions 
+ BORROWER’S 
FLEXIBILITY 
a) Subrogation: yes, but with limits 
(art. 2 Act 2/94) 
b) Partial or complete reuse of the 
mortgage: no (arts. 668.3 LEC and 
236f.4 RH) 
c) Reducibility: no (art. 122 LH) 
a) Subro.: no in Ukraine, Russia, 
Poland 
b) Reuse: no in Russia, Romania 
c) Reduc.: yes in Germany (§§ 
1144 y 1145 BGB) 
Possible, without 
restrictions 
EUROSECURITI-
SATION AND 
EFFICIENT 
TRANSFER OF 
MORTGAGES 
a) Fiduciary transfer of mort-
gages: no. Important legal disrup-
tions. 
b) Massive transfer of mortgages: 
too strict and even worse in Act 
41/2007 (art. 1528 CC; art. 11.3 Act 
41/2007 
a) Only possible in Germany 
(2003), Estonia, Hungary, Roma-
nia and Slovenia. Equity solution 
under common law jurisdictions. 
b) Very flexible in Switzerland, 
Germany or common law juris-
dictions 
All possible, with-
out restrictions. 
Moreover: multi-
parcel Eurohypotec
FREE MORT-
GAGE LOANS 
SYNDICATION 
Only initial; not possible efficient 
ongoing syndication 
Only possible in Germany, UK, 
Denmark, Switzerland, Estonia 
and Sweden 
Possible, without 
restrictions 
EUROLANDREG-
ISTER 
Good Land Registry system (on-line 
consult through 
www.registradores.org, digital sig-
nature); but not in EULIS 
- Some countries are in EULIS 
- Others have no computerised 
Land Registry (Bosnia, Ukraine, 
Romania) 
- Others, e-conveyancing (UK) 
Fully compatible 
with EULIS 
A PANEURO-
PEAN MORT-
GAGE SOLU-
TION 
Most of the solutions that may suit 
under Spanish law may not suit un-
der other countries’ law (ie. Lack of 
notaries) 
Countries tend to find “national” 
solutions, disregarding interna-
tional mortgage business 
The Eurohypothec 
facilitates a true 
European mort-
gage market 
 
Table 2. Eurohypothec, new Spanish mortgage and European panorama 
2. Comparisons between the Spanish mortgage reform 2007 and the 
Eurohypothec  
Although mortgage credit relationships between the same lender and same bor-
rower have been optimized (ie. rechargeable mortgages), none of the busi-
nesses that require a split between the mortgage and secured obligation can be 
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undertaken under the Spanish mortgage system or can be undertaken effi-
ciently, as can obviously be undertaken by employing the Eurohypothec and in 
those jurisdictions where the link between mortgage and secured loan is not 
legal. These are the conditions for financial operations like securitization, the 
massive trans-national transfer of mortgages and the syndication on mortgage 
loans.  
In addition, the Spanish reform does not provide an optimal solution for 
borrowers under Spanish jurisdiction, as they are permanently tied to a single 
lender (which is regarded as a bad praxis by the White Paper 2007), without an 
easy way of changing lenders or including another into the first’s mortgage 
rights to obtain more advantageous loans. In fact, the land of the mortgagor is 
over-indebted following the first payment of the mortgage instalment as there 
is no possibility of unilaterally reducing its amount in the Land Register, while 
the mortgagor has no possibility of reusing the mortgage once he has repaid 
the full loan. Both the jurisprudence of the Spanish High Court (STS40 25-11-
2003) and the administrative organ that decides the recourses against decisions 
of Notaries and Land Registrars (the DGRN41; see the Resolution DGRN 21-7-
1995), and Art. 13 of the Mortgages’ Reform Act (which replaces art. 2 Act 
2/1994) have misinterpreted the function of Act 2/1994 (on the contrary, see a 
more appropriate interpretation at AAP42 León 24-2-1998, which considered 
that changing the lender should always remain in the hands of the debtor with-
out further restrictions; see also art. 1211 CC), which tried to give more dyna-
mism to the mortgage market. Since the new Act has come into force, the bor-
rower no longer has the right to freely change his lender and can only do so if 
he is offered better conditions for the mortgage loan, with the possibility of the 
first lender matching these conditions. If this were to be the case, the borrower 
would have to stay with the first lender, disregarding the reason for changing 
the lender (ie. better treatment, concession of further loans, etc.).  
Moreover, the DGRN still operates “in a Spanish way”, vetoing deeds pro-
duced by notaries’ from other European countries to be registered in the Span-
ish Land Register for land conveyance or other land-related operations, 
through the RDGRN 2-7-2005.43 However, more than a year later, this Resolu-
tion has been found to be void and against not only EU principles, but also 
                                                 
40  Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, Spanish Highest Court Resolution. 
41  Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado 
42  Auto Audiencia Provincial, Order of a Court of Appeal 
43  A similar situation took place several years ago during the registeration of a Swiss No-
tary title in Germany. This incident was also heavily criticized by the pro-European 
doctrine (Heinz, Volker G., Beurkundung von Erklärungen zur Auflassung deutscher 
Grundstücke durch bestellte Notare im Ausland, „RIW“, 12/2001, p. 928). 
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against the Rome Convention 1980 by SAP Santa Cruz de Tenerife 22-11-
2006.44 Perhaps the creation of a common database in every EU Land Register 
– the Eurotitle45 – would be advisable to avoid such problems in the future. 
Obviously the Eurotitle would serve as a good complement for the Eurohy-
pothec.  
And finally, while several mortgage-related topics have been addressed by 
Act 41/2007 with greater or less success, it has not addressed crucial needed 
reforms in relation to mortgage securities46 (cédulas hipotecarias – Spanish 
covered bonds –, bonos hipotecarios and bonos de titulización hipotecaria –
Spanish mortgage-backed securities, MBS-, essentially). Along with legal 
structural problems that still persist: legal nature of their guarantee, it consti-
tutes an even worse regulation for covered debts (bonos hipotecarios). More-
over, inaccuracies in regulating the covering Register (in German Pfand-
briefgesetz this is referred to as the Deckungsregister), lack of the fiduciary 
(the Treuhänder in Germany), uncertainties in their behaviour in insolvency 
proceedings, etc. still exist. On contrast, as seen previously, the Eurohypothec 
would allow for the so-called Eurosecuritisation while the Eurotrust would fa-
cilitate the massive transfer of mortgage loans on a trans-national level, bring-
ing to the European mortgage market more efficiency and dynamism.  
IV. Conclusions  
1. National regulations for mortgages are being reformed to make them more 
flexible, following the introduction of the concept of the Eurohypothec but 
without Paneuropean awareness. The White Paper 2007 could possibly help 
push forward a true harmonization of the European mortgage market.  
2. The Eurohypothec of the Basic Guidelines 2005 is fully compliant with the 
objectives of the White Paper 2007 (p. 13): it enhances “competitiveness 
and efficiency of EU mortgage markets which will benefit consumers, 
mortgage lenders and investors alike”; it demonstrates its ability to create 
“new opportunities for mortgage lenders to access other markets and engage 
                                                 
44  See the vision of a Spanish Notary at Rivas Andrés, Rafael, Notas sobre la recepción 
en España de poderes extranjeros no formalizados en escritura pública, “Notarius In-
ternational”, 3-4/2005, pp. 293 to 300. 
45  Ploeger, Hendrik, Nasarre Aznar, Sergio and Van Loenen, Bastian, EuroTitle: A Stan-
dard for European Land Registry. Paving the Road to a Common Real Estate Market, 
„GIM-International. The Global Magazine for Geomatics“, December 2005, vol. 19, 
num. 12, pp. 34 to 37. 
46  See above, footnote 10 for the concept of mortgage securities. 
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in cross-border activity”; it enables “a more efficient mortgage lending 
process”; it leads “to improved product diversity and, potentially, lower 
prices for consumers”; it improves “consumer mobility through increased 
transparency and reduced product tying”; it enhances “market transparency, 
greater certainty [...] and a broader range of investment opportunities as a 
result of enhanced product diversity both within primary and secondary 
markets”. However, whereas the White Paper 2007 refers to future “main 
tasks or activities” (essentially to organise specialised groups and to organ-
ize further studies without any link in common), it does not specifically 
mention the Eurohypothec, which raises the doubt: how will the EU achieve 
the already mentioned objectives without the Eurohypothec? These seg-
mented activities (p. 14) are obviously not enough to achieve a true Euro-
pean mortgage market. 
3. To create a true Paneuropean mortgage market, a Eurohypothec is needed 
– probably the model of the Basic Guidelines – which should be as secure, 
useful and flexible as possible, both for lenders and borrowers  
4. The Eurotrust is a needed complement to the Eurohypothec in order to fa-
cilitate all types of fiduciary mortgage operations.  
5. Other partners for the Eurohypothec would be EULIS, the Eurotitle and the 
possibility of establishing a true mortgage Eurosecuritisation. 
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